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Abstract—The 3 most important issues for anomaly detection 
based intrusion detection systems by using data mining methods 
are: feature selection, data value normalization, and the choice of 
data mining algorithms. In this paper, we study primarily the 
feature selection of network traffic and its impact on the detection 
rates. We use KDD CUP 1999 dataset as the sample for the study. 
We group the features of the dataset into 4 groups: Group I 
contains the basic network traffic features; Group II is actually 
not network traffic related, but the features collected from hosts; 
Group III and IV are temporally aggregated features. In this 
paper, we demonstrate the different detection rates of choosing 
the different combinations of these groups. We also demonstrate 
the effectiveness and the ineffectiveness in finding anomalies by 
looking at the network data alone. In addition, we also briefly 
investigate the effectiveness of data normalization. To validate our 
findings, we conducted the same experiments with 3 different 
clustering algorithms - K-means clustering, fuzzy C means 
clustering (FCM), and fuzzy entropy clustering (FE).  
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, Clustering methods, 
Feature extraction 
I. INTRODUCTION
N GENERAL, there are two types of intrusion detection 
systems (IDS): signature based IDS and anomaly detection 
based IDS. Signature based IDS are reactive. Intrusion patterns 
have to be provided beforehand, and the system always legs 
behind the new attacks. On the other hand, anomaly detection 
based IDS promises proactive detections through continuously 
machine learning, with little human intervening. The learning 
process could be unsupervised just from network data or 
supervised from labeled data. 
Many different types of technology have been proposed as 
the detection engines. Due to the highly irregular distribution of 
the network data, which has “power-law distribution” and is 
“one-sided and heavy tailed” [1], using clustering method is 
strongly advocated by a number of research groups. The 3 most 
important issues for anomaly detection by using clustering 
methods, and indeed any machine learning algorithm, are: 
feature selection, data value normalization, and the choice of 
Manuscript received January 30, 2000.  
Wanli Ma, Dat Tran, and Dharmendra Sharma are with Faculty of 
Information Sciences and Engineering, University of Canberra, Australia 
(phone: +61.2.62012838; fax: +61.2.62015231; e-mail: Wanli.Ma@ 
canberra.edu.au).  
algorithms. 
In this paper, we study the impact of the feature selection of 
network traffic data on anomaly network traffic detection rates. 
We use KDD CUP 1999 dataset as the sample. We classify the 
fields of the dataset vectors into 4 groups. Group I fields are the 
basic network traffic attributes; Group II fields are actually not 
network traffic related, and they are from host based 
monitoring sensors; Group III and IV fields are time based 
attributes. We study the different combinations of these groups. 
To validate our findings, which are not just accidental under a 
set of one-off experiments, we choose 3 different clustering 
algorithms – K means clustering, fuzzy C-means clustering 
(FCM), and fuzzy entropy clustering (FE) – to conduct the 
same experiments. We are aware of the criticisms on claiming 
detection rates solely based on a single dataset [2]. Without 
losing the generality, we do not try to fine-tune the clustering 
algorithms to achieve the premium detection rates for this 
particular dataset. Our primary focus in this paper is the 
comparison of different detection rates achieved by selecting 
different features and the consistence of the comparison results 
under different algorithms. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: in Section II, we briefly 
discuss the related work. Section III provides the background 
information. In Section IV, we study the impact of the different 
combinations of the features with the discussions of our 
observations. We conclude the paper with future work in 
Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK
All the proposals listed in this section use either KDD CUP 
1999 dataset [4] or DARPA 1999 dataset [7]. By no mean do 
we inclusively take the account of all possible proposals.  
In [3], Portnoy proposed to use a simple variant of 
single-linkage clustering method to learn network traffic 
patterns on unlabelled noisy data. The author made 2 
assumptions: the number of normal activities is far larger than 
that of abnormal activities, and the sample data reflects the 
distribution of day to day network operation. It is not clear from 
the paper which fields (attributes) are used. The approach 
achieves 40%-55% detection rate with 1.3%-2.3% false 
positive rate.  
NATE [5, 6] was proposed by Taylor and Alves-Foss. The 
approach is similar to Portnoy’s, but the authors suggested that 
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Abstract —Cyberactivism refers to the use of the Internet to 
advocate vigorous or intentional actions to bring about social or 
political change. Cyberactivism analysis aims to improve the 
understanding of cyber activists and their online communities. In 
this paper, we present a case study of online Free Tibet activities. 
For web site analysis, we use the inlink and outlink information of 
five selected seed URLs to construct the network of Free Tibet 
web sites. The network shows the close relationships between our 
five seed sites. Centrality measures reveal that tibet.org is 
probably an information hub site in the network. Further content 
analysis tells us that common hub site words are most popular in 
tibet.org whereas dalailama.com focuses mostly on religious 
words. For forum analysis, descriptive statistics such as the 
number of posts each month and the post distribution of forum 
users illustrate that the two large forums FreeTibetAndYou and 
RFAnews-Tibbs have experienced significant reduction in 
activities in recent years and that a small percentage of their users 
contribute the majority of posts. Important phrases of several 
long threads and active forum users are identified by using 
mutual information and TF-IDF scores. Such topical analyses 
help us understand the topics discussed in the forums and the 
ideas and interest of those forum users. Finally, social network 
analyses of the forum users are conducted to reflect their 
interactions and the social structure of their online communities. 
Index Terms — Cyberactivism, Forum Analysis, Free Tibet, 
Web Site Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION
CTIVISM often refers to vigorous or intentional actions 
that aim to bring about social or political change [1]. The 
rapid development of the Internet makes it an ideal source for 
information and propaganda dissemination [2] [3]. Cyber 
activists use web sites, forums, and other types of computer 
media to build relationships with the public, voice their 
opinions, and spread their propaganda [4] [5]. Consequently, 
Cyberactivism, which refers to activism on the Internet, has 
emerged as a new and important social phenomenon. 
A comprehensive and systematic framework for analysis of 
Cyberactivism needs to be developed for researchers, analysts, 
and related government agents to get a better understanding of 
cyber activists and their online communities. For example, it 
has been observed that web sites of related activism groups are 
linked to each other through hyperlinks, creating their own 
community network [6]. A good research framework would 
include an effective method to identify such networks and the 
roles of the web sites in the networks. In forums, social 
networks of forum users, representative topics and phrases, and 
active users are useful information that can help understand 
member interactions. 
This paper presents a case study of online Free Tibet 
activities and is an initial attempt toward a framework to 
analyze Cyberactivism. Two popular Internet media, web sites 
and forums of Free Tibet activities, are identified, collected, 
and analyzed. We aim to shed light on the following research 
questions:
1. What automated methods can be used to analyze 
Cyberactivism? 
2. What knowledge and insights can we gain through 
social network and topical analysis of Cyberactivism? 
II. FREE TIBET
Tibet generally refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, a 
province-level entity governed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). Religion is extremely important to the Tibetans 
and Tibet is the traditional center of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lamas and Dalai Lamas are two well-known spiritual 
leaders of Tibetans.
Tibet was first included into China’s territory in the 1300s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet and Mongolia 
signed a treaty proclaiming mutual recognition and their 
independence from the Republic of China.  When the China 
Civil War ended in 1949, Tibet became a part of the PRC. In 
1959, PRC armies thwarted the Tibetan resistance movement 
and Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, fled to India. 
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also referred to 
as the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGE), is headed by the 
14th Dalai Lama and claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet.  Free Tibet activities refer to activities 
that aim to support the independence of Tibet. Most Free Tibet 
activities are guided by the CTA. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Free Tibet related web sites and forums are the focuses of 
this case study. Such web sites and forums are created and 
maintained by activists, supporters, and sympathizers in a 
variety of languages, including English, Chinese, and Tibetan. 
In this study, we propose different methodologies for analysis 
of each medium. 
A. Web Site Analysis 
1) Identifying and Collecting Important Web Sites 
Since there are many Free Tibet web sites available, the first 
step is to identify which ones are important. Fig. 1 shows our 
identification process. 
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it might not be the case that the number of normal network 
activities are always far larger than that of abnormal activities. 
From the papers, it is unclear how and also if data 
normalization is carried out.  
Chan et al [1] also used DARPA dataset for their clustering 
based IDS – CLAD (Clustering for Anomaly Detection). The 
clustering algorithm used is k-NN, and the training process is 
unsupervised. The authors first converted the symbolic values 
into digital values, and then normalized these values based on 
logarithm. 
Li and Ye [8] proposed to use CCAS clustering algorithm, 
supervised clustering and classification. Instead of using the 
network traffic records, they used BSM audit records. 
Interestingly, they only used one attribute (event type).  
Caruso and Malerba [9] tested Weka data mining tools 
(K-means and EM) on their firewall logs. The selected features 
are time stamps, protocol, destination IP, Source IP, Service 
port, number of packets, duration, and the country of source IP 
address. From the paper, it is unclear how symbolic values (e.g., 
protocols) are handled, and also how and if data normalization 
is carried out. 
Wang and Megalooikonomou [10] proposed to use the 
Fuzzy-Connectedness Clustering (FCC) algorithm. They 
achieved 94% detection rate and a false alarm rate below 4% on 
the KDD CUP dataset. However, in the paper, they did not 
mention how many features were used, how symbolic values 
were processed, nor if there is any normalization. 
III. GROUPING KDD CUP 1999 DATASET
KDD CUP 1999 dataset was based on MIT Lincoln Lab 
intrusion detection dataset, also known as DARPA dataset. The 
raw network traffic records have already been converted into 
vector format. Each vector has 41 fields (features), Table I. We 
refer the readers to [4] and [11] for the meanings of the fields. 
In this paper, we ignore the fields with symbolic values, i.e., 
field 1, 2, 3, and 6. The rest of the fields are grouped into 4 
groups: 
? Group I: fields 0, 4, 5, and 7, these fields are the basic 
characteristics of a connection. They are the durations, 
the octets transferred, and wrong fragmentation flags of 
the connection. 
? Group II: fields 10-19, these fields are actually not 
traffic features. The values cannot be obtained by 
looking at the traffic records alone. The help from host 
based logs is needed. 
? Group III: fields 22-30, these fields are time based 
traffic features. They are the statistics of traffic features 
in the previous 2 seconds time window. The calculation 
is based on the source IP address. 
? Group IV: fields 31-40: the same as Group III, except 
for that the calculation is destination IP address oriented.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS
The proposed method for the network intrusion detection 
was evaluated using the KDD CUP dataset for training and the 
“corrected” dataset for testing. Training sets for the 23 attacks 
were extracted from KDD CUP dataset and the maximum 
number of feature vectors for each of the training sets was set to 
1000. All 311029 feature vectors in the testing set were used. 
Because the feature values have different ranges, the 
following normalization of features is therefore used: 
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where xtj is the j-th feature of the t-th vector, ?j the mean value 
of all T vectors for feature j, and sj the absolute standard 
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For each of the clustering algorithms, we trained 23 models 
for the 23 attacks using the training sets extracted from the 
KDD CUP dataset. We have conducted the experiments with 
15 different combinations of Group I, II, III, and IV. Each 
individual experiment is conducted with the raw data and the 
normalized data. 
There are a few interesting observations, take for example 
the run of all features (i.e., Group I, II, III, and IV) with 
K-means clustering algorithm. The recognition rates for the 
labels A (back), G (land), K (nmap), O (pod), and R (Satan)
are pretty high. Labels A, G, and O are all denial of services 
attacks, and Labels K and R are port scanning activities. These 
types of activities have distinct network features.  
TABLE I, THE RECOGNITION RATES (%) FOR VECTORS WITH THE “NORMAL”
LABEL. DATA VALUES ARE NORMALIZED.
group K-means FCM FE 
1 I 40.7 38.4 35.5
2 II III 62.1 62.2 68.1
3 I II III 68.3 61.3 63.2
4 I II 69.4 70.2 68.8
5 II 70 70 70
6 I II III IV 82.1 80 80.4
7 I III 83 86 83.6
8 I III IV 85.4 83.6 85.2
9 III IV 87.1 79.5 72.7
10 IV 88.3 91.1 87.7
11 I IV 88.8 88.7 87.6
12 II IV 88.8 61.7 89.2
13 I II IV 89 88 89.1
14 III 89.1 80.9 78.5
15 II III IV 90.4 81.3 80.3
On the other hand, the recognition rates for the labels B 
(buffer_overflow), C (ftp_write), D (guess_passwd), F 
(ipsweep), H (loadmodule), I (multihop), J (neptune), M 
(perl), N (phf), S (smurf), and W (warezmaster) are very low. 
Among them, labels B, C, D, H, M, N, and W actually cannot 
be detected by checking network traffic data alone. They 
belong to host based intrusion detection. Monitoring data at 
host level is needed. Due to the lack of extensive host level data, 
the low recognition rates are understandable. Label I represents 
complicated multiday activities, and more work is needed to 
improve the low recognition rate. Label F describes a type of 
port scanning activities. It is largely misclassified as label C. 
We don’t know the reasons yet. Both label J and label S belong 
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to denial of services attacks. Label J is misrecognized mainly as 
R (40.3%) and D (29.3%). Both J and R have large number of 
SYN packets. It is the reason why 40.3% J vectors are 
misclassified as R vectors. Label S is basically recognized as U 
(76.6%), which is another type of denial of services attacks. 
For the purpose of our experiments, from this point on, we 
will concentrate only on the recognition rates of the vectors 
with the “normal” label. All the other labels are regarded as 
abnormal (or anomaly). Table I lists the recognition rates, 
under the different combinations of features, on normalized 
data values, with the 3 different clustering algorithms, and 
Table II lists the same results, but on the raw data values, i.e., 
without normalization. 
TABLE II, RECOGNITION RATES (%) FOR VECTORS WITH THE “NORMAL” LABEL.
DATA VALUES ARE NOT NORMALIZED.
 group K-means FCM FE 
1 I II 23.2 32.4 34.9 
2 I II III 23.2 44.2 34.1 
3 III 23.4 27.6 30.6 
4 I III 25.1 43.4 48.4 
5 I 25.12 38.7 40.1 
6 I II IV 25.8 42.4 35.9 
7 I II III IV 25.8 22.4 38.6 
8 I IV 28.6 45.1 49.5 
9 I III IV 28.6 35.4 56.5 
10 II III 32.2 30.5 36.5 
11 II IV 33.5 34.7 33.5 
12 IV 40.5 37.5 40.1 
13 III IV 52.4 52.9 52.6 
14 II III IV 52.5 52.7 52.7 
15 II 70 70 70 
From Table II, we can see that Group III or IV alone 
contributes most to the recognition rate (Row 14 and 10), and 
the other fields actually more or less contribute negatively. 
Clustering on either Group III or Group IV only (Row 14 and 
10, Table II) yields almost the best results in our studies. Either 
has almost the same result as the other. However, combining 
both groups together does not significantly increase the 
recognition rates (Row 9, Table II). More generally, adding any 
extra information, by adding features from the other groups, to 
either group does not significantly increase the recognition 
rates. The differences from Row 10 to Row 15, Table II, are so 
marginal and can be safely disregarded. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the impact of feature selection and 
data normalization on detecting anomaly network traffic. We 
use KDD CUP 1999 dataset as the sample for the study, and the 
detection algorithms used are K-means clustering, fuzzy C 
means clustering, and fuzzy entropy clustering. We have run 
the clustering experiments with 15 different combinations of 
the fields (features) from the dataset vectors. Each experiment 
is conducted with the raw data and also the normalised data. We 
found out that: 
? Time based traffic features, which are temporally 
amalgamated values of traffic features in the last 2 
seconds time window, contribute most to the 
recognition rates. 
? Time based traffic features can be calculated based on 
either the sources or the destinations of the network 
connections. Either calculation provides almost the 
same results. Combining the 2 together does not 
increase recognition rates. 
? The features which are host related (not network 
related) yield irregular results due to the fact that the 
values for these fields are exactly the same for about 
70% of the vectors. 
? Normalization is important. 
In the near feature, we will conduct more experiments. We’d 
like to test the time based features on different sizes of time 
windows, instead of just 2 seconds as on KDD CUP 1999 
dataset. We will also study the impact of different 
normalization methods and the impact of weighted features. 
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